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governance in the Nordic countries 
a b s t r a c t 
This paper explores and compares health system responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in Denmark, Fin- 
land, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, in the context of existing governance features. Content compiled in 
the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor combined with other publicly available country informa- 
tion serve as the foundation for this analysis. The analysis mainly covers early response until August 
2020, but includes some key policy and epidemiological developments up until December 2020. 
Our findings suggest that despite the many similarities in adopted policy measures, the five countries 
display differences in implementation as well as outcomes. Declaration of state of emergency has dif- 
fered in the Nordic region, whereas the emphasis on specialist advisory agencies in the decision-making 
process is a common feature. There may be differences in how respective populations complied with the 
recommended measures, and we suggest that other structural and circumstantial factors may have an 
important role in variations in outcomes across the Nordic countries. The high incidence rates among 
migrant populations and temporary migrant workers, as well as differences in working conditions are 
important factors to explore further. An important question for future research is how the COVID-19 epi- 
demic will influence legislation and key principles of governance in the Nordic countries. 
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic called for rapid pub- 
ic health responses to avoid spread of the infection and prevent 
OVID-19 related deaths, and the Nordic region was not an ex- 
eption. The epidemiological situation has varied across the Nordic 
ountries, which may reflect different policy responses as well as 
nstitutional structures. Differences may also reflect the resilience 
f health systems. 
In the past, the structural commonalities have inspired many 
bservers to argue that there is a distinct “Nordic model” of 
ealth care, sometimes labelled as an “integrated public corporatist 
odel” [1] or a more decentralized version of the NHS in the UK 
2] . Recently, the countries have chosen somewhat diverging paths 
ith regards to the level of centralization or decentralization in the 
nancing and provision of health services [3] . 
There are constitutional differences and divergence in the tradi- 
ions of interaction between national governments, state agencies, 
nd decentralized authorities across the five countries which influ- 
nce the range of policies adopted in a public health crisis. Institu- 
ional structures set the boundaries for decision-making and limit 
he range of likely and possible choices. Institutional veto points 
nd standard operation procedures may on the one hand indicate 
hat radical changes are rare and require substantial external or 
nternal shock to open the political window for action. In more re- 
ent contributions to the social science it has, however, been ar- 
ued that transformations may also be the outcome of more evo- 
utionary developments [4 , 5] . When studying the impact of the 
ovid-19 crisis for the healthcare systems it is therefore necessary 
o understand the context within each system. 
The Swedish response to the COVID-19 pandemic has in par- 
icular been the subject of an intense academic, as well as polit- 
cal debate [6] . In contrast to most of the EU countries and the
ordic neighbors, the initial lack of more stringent policy measures 
ade Sweden an outlier in terms of both the pandemic response 
s well as the initial impact on population health, with mortality 
ates markedly higher than in other Nordic countries [7] . 
The overall aim of this paper is to explore and compare the 
ordic health systems’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in the 
ontext of governance features and provide insight into differences 
nd similarities in terms of policy responses to the epidemiologi- 
al situation. This overview not only contributes with comparable 
nformation on implementation of policy measures and outcomes, 
ut analyses the role of governance mechanisms and the challeng- 
ng balance between health policy advice and governmental deci- 
ions. 
ethods 
This analysis builds on the methodology and content com- 
iled in the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor (HSRM). 
he HSRM was established in March 2020 and designed to collect 
nd disseminate up-to-date information on how countries, mainly 
n the WHO European Region, are responding to the crisis (see 
ww.covid19healthsystem.org ). The HSRM content is structured 
round standard health system functions [8] , capturing policy re- 
ponses related to governance, resource generation, financing, and 
ervice delivery, as well as measures to prevent transmission of the 
irus. The information is collected and regularly updated, enabling 
road comparisons across countries. 
The policy insights emerging from the Nordic countries – Den- 
ark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, is focused on the gov- 
rnance and legislation, as well as selected measures of preventing 
ransmission. 
The identification of key policy insights from country experi- 
nces followed a deliberative process that included extensive re- 
iew of the HSRM materials and structured discussions among ar- 
icle co-authors, Observatory editors, and other experts. Where rel- 2 vant, other country material, key documents and literature are 
sed to inform the paper [9–13] . 
The aim was not to definitively answer why some countries 
ave dealt better with the pandemic than others, but rather to 
raw out interesting patterns, key contrasts, and innovative ap- 
roaches in policy responses aimed at addressing common chal- 
enges across countries. Indeed, attributing any causal link between 
olicy response and pandemic outcome is fraught with method- 
logical challenges. Rather, the analysis intended to describe gov- 
rnance and assess policy responses and draw out critical lessons. 
n turn, this can serve as a basis from which to begin discus- 
ions that eventually lead to an understanding of what seems to 
ork, what does not work, and why. The analysis also intended 
o throw into relief current gaps in policy knowledge i.e. what we 
till need to know, which can open up areas for future research. 
ltimately, this analysis aimed to provide policymakers with policy 
ptions as they design their own responses to current and future 
rises. 
The analysis covers mainly the period from February 2020 until 
ugust 2020, but also comments on some key policy and epidemi- 
logical developments up until the end of December 2020. 
esults 
urrent politics and political background 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden share many 
ultural, historical, social and welfare structure characteristics, and 
ell-established political cooperation in the form of the Nordic 
ouncil and the Nordic Council of Ministers [14] . 
The Nordic countries, with a total population of 27.4 million, 
re all representative democracies, often led by minority coalitions. 
ver the course of 2020, Iceland and Finland had majority coali- 
ions, whereas Norway and Sweden had minority coalitions and 
enmark was governed by a minority party. Ideologically the gov- 
rnments varied from conservative (Norway), social-democratic in 
enmark, and left-green with support of the center parties in Fin- 
and and Sweden and center-right parties in Iceland. 
All governments had broad support for their initial responses 
o the pandemic in their respective parliaments as well as among 
he public. Criticism and political debate emerged in all countries 
n the late spring, with the easing of the restriction measures. 
he development of the pandemic in the Nordic countries and the 
nitial policy responses 
By the last week of February 2020, all five Nordic countries had 
egistered their first COVID-cases. By mid-March Denmark, Finland, 
celand and Norway had implemented a number of strict policy 
easures such as closure of borders and schools, restriction on 
ocial gatherings and access to restaurants etc., whereas Sweden 
alled for caution and remained open. The burden of the pandemic 
xpressed in the number of cases and deaths has not been uniform 
cross the region ( Fig. 1 ). 
Data limitations in terms of comparability of testing and mor- 
ality coding notwithstanding [ 15 , 16 ], Sweden appeared to be the 
utlier in terms of the high incidences rates and the number 
f COVID-19 deaths in 2020. In the end of July and until early 
eptember, the patterns in the Nordic countries became more sim- 
lar with relatively low incidence rates, before they increased with 
arying degree in the beginning of autumn. Sweden and Denmark 
oth experienced rapid increase in incident rates which they man- 
ged to curb in December 2020. 
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ational legislation underpinning the COVID-19 response 
Even though the legal systems in the Nordic countries share 
any commonalities, the degree to which new or pre-existing leg- 
slation allow implementation of strict measures varies. Legislative 
rovisions for infectious disease control can be used to impose far- 
eaching restrictions on the citizens in order to prevent further 
pread of diseases. COVID-19 was listed as a communicable dis- 
ase in the respective infectious disease acts by governmental de- 
rees early in 2020 in all the Nordic countries. Likewise, national 
isaster or preparedness acts, when invoked, give the national 
overnments extended emergency powers and the right to im- 
ose strict emergency regulations on their respective populations 
 Table 1 ). 3 Iceland, Finland and Norway invoked national preparedness acts 
n March 2020. This empowered the government to make country- 
ide decisions on several restrictions. However, most of the mea- 
ures were taken in the context of ordinary legislation giving re- 
ional/local authorities sufficient powers, such as issuing quaran- 
ine or closing public spaces. Additionally, Norway issued a Coron- 
virus Act (2020), authorising the government to carry out restric- 
ive measures to address the effects of COVID-19. 
Neither Denmark nor Sweden invoked a state of emergency in 
he spring 2020. For Sweden, the legal framework does not allow 
 declaration of a state of emergency due to a pandemic, but the 
arliament has the power to institute new laws very rapidly in case 
f emergencies. Denmark and Sweden both imposed new policies 
uring the COVID-19 by amending existing legislation. The Danish 
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Table 1 
Important legislation and pandemic plans underpinning initial COVID-19 response in the Nordic countries. 
Acts and 
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pidemic Act (2019) allows the government to temporarily suspend 
pecific rights and obligations outlined by other legislation, when 
t is necessary to prevent or contain a dangerous contagious dis- 
ase or to maintain heath care capacity to provide health care ser- 
ices to citizens. In Sweden, a temporary legislation (amendment 
o Communicable Diseases Act) was invoked from mid-April until 
he end of June, empowering the government to impose restric- 
ions on restaurants, bars, shopping malls, transportations, etc. in 
rder to contain the spread. This was not utilized, but an amend- 
ent to the public order act was used to regulate the number of 
eople permitted to gather in public spaces. 
A Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement (2002) requires 
he countries to share information on measures that may influence 
he cooperation between the countries. This extends to relevant 
egislative measures, as well as the obligation to facilitate exchange 
f experiences, cooperation and competence building. The World 
ealth Organisation’s International Health Regulation (IHR) from 
005 is incorporated in the national legislation in all the Nordic 
ountries [17] 
overnance approaches in practice 
During the COVID-19 response, the Nordic countries have been 
uided by the following principles in terms of emergency manage- 
ent, which are incorporated in national legislation [18] : 
• sector responsibility remains in the sector during crises; 
• emergency management should reflect standard procedures; 
• emergency management should be handled at lowest effective 
organisational level possible; and 
• authorities are responsible for cooperation and coordination 
with each other in terms of planning and management. 
Formal responsibility for the development of policy responses 
o COVID-19 lies with the respective governments, while any 
hange to the legislation must be adopted by the parliaments in 
ll five Nordic countries, including in an emergency situation. The 
inisters of Health are all heads of the ministerial departments (in 
he case of Finland there are two ministers of Health), and National 
gencies, subordinate to the Ministries of Health, act independent 4 f their national governments. The ministries may steer them indi- 
ectly through instructions, missions and financing. 
In Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden the regulatory re- 
ponsibility of advice on communicable diseases are located in 
he agencies responsible for monitoring and assessing the situa- 
ion together with ECDC and WHO. In Iceland, the Chief Epidemi- 
logist, advising and preparing recommendations to the Minister 
f Health, operates within the Directorate of Health, while the 
ecision-making authority in response to pandemics is centralised 
nd rests with the Minister of Health. 
In Norway, the Directorate of Health is in charge of overall co- 
rdination of the health and care sector’s efforts and implements 
he necessary measures during an emergency situation. In Sweden, 
he Public Health Agency (SPHA) with the Chief Epidemiologist, as 
n Iceland, is responsible for applying the infection control legisla- 
ion at the national level. In Denmark, The Danish Health Author- 
ty and Statens Serum Institute (SSI) are responsible for monitoring 
nd providing recommendations to the Minister of Health. In Fin- 
and, the national expert agency is the Finnish Institute for Health 
nd Welfare (THL). 
With the exemption of Iceland, regional or local authorities 
with respective Chief Medical officers) are responsible for coordi- 
ating local policies and recommendations with the state agencies. 
hey are also responsible for necessary precautions against trans- 
ission of disease, and the Chief Medical Officers have the power 
o enforce measures, such as testing and quarantine and/or isola- 
ion against individuals, to counter a public health crisis. The re- 
ponsibility for securing bed and ICU capacity and handling COVID- 
9 in the hospitals lies in regional organisations in Denmark, Fin- 
and, Norway, and Sweden, while in Iceland the responsibility is at 
he national level. 
National guidelines for handling the epidemics are provided in 
ll countries, but the power of enforcing adherence to the guide- 
ines varies with the status of the guidelines as either advisory 
r mandatory. This is reflected in the national preparedness plans 
or pandemics in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway. In Swe- 
en, where regions are responsible for handling the pandemic, 
here is not one national plan, but 21 regional preparedness plans. 
egional/local preparedness plans are also present in the other 
ordic countries, underpinned by a national plan. 
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Table 2 
Selected preventive measures adopted at population level in the Nordic countries during the first 6 months (March through August 2020). 
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
Travel restrictions citizens/residents: 
- International/EU (leisure) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) 
- Nordic (leisure) (X) (X) (X) (X) X 
- Quarantine upon (re)entry from high risk area (X) X X X 
Travel restrictions EU/EEA citizens– (entry ) 
-Leisure/non-essential purpose (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) 
-Quarantine or negative test (X) (X) (X) (X) 
-Exceptions for migrant workers and other "worthy purposes" (X) (X) (X) X 
Internal mobility restrictions 
-travel across municipal/regional borders (X) (X) (X) (X) 
-curfew/mobility outside home 
Childcare and education: 
- closure of nurseries / kindergartens 





- remote education in middle/high schools X (X) (X) (X) (X) 
- remote post-secondary education (e.g. universities) X (X) (X) (X) X 
Recommendation to work from home 
-private businesses X (X) (X) X X 
-public sector (non-essential) X (X) (X) X X 
Restricting access for visitors 
-nursing homes and hospitals X X X X X 
Closing or restricting access to 
-restaurants and bars (X) (X) X (X) (X) 
-Retail shops (non-food) and non-essential retail services (X) 
-indoor sports facilities (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) 
-cultural events (concerts, theatres, museums, spectator sports etc) (X) (X) (X) (X) (X) 
Maximum number of persons gathered at Public events 10 10 10 5 50 
Maximum number of persons gathered in Private homes 10 10 10 5 50 
Contact tracing X X X X (X) 
Self-isolation when infected X X X X X 
Physical distancing 1 m 2 m X 1m 2m 
Face mask required (X) (X) (X) (X) 
() = temporary + partial, bold = mandated by law, - Regular = recommendation; Physical distancing is highly recommended, whereas wearing a face 
mask is only recommended when physical distancing is not possible. For gatherings of persons the number is the lowest that have been recom- 























































During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, all countries 
eported the same broad COVID-19 policy aims: to ensure suffi- 
ient capacity in the health care system; to prevent deaths due 
o COVID-19 and to prevent new cases. Broadly, the strategy was 
o contain and reduce the spread of the virus. Special consider- 
tions were given to protect older people and other vulnerable 
roups in all countries. There were also calls from the countries’ 
eaderships for solidarity to reduce the risk of infection spread 
nd emphasis on voluntary effort, as all countries communicated 
 strong reliance on the public to follow the recommendations. 
able 2 presents an overview of the main policy measures adopted 
t population level in all the Nordic countries from March through 
ugust 2020. 
In the spring 2020, comprehensive national measures were 
aken in Denmark, Finland and Norway, where the strategy was to 
top the spread of the virus by issuing the strictest policy measures 
aken in times of peace. It was enforced through restrictions on 
nternational travel, combined with reduced social interaction in 
he population (closure of non-essential businesses, schools, public 
vents, etc.). Finland and Norway also had restrictions on internal 
obility for a short period of time. It should be noted that curfews 
ave not been imposed in any of the Nordic countries, and many 
ducational facilities and businesses have remained in operation by 
onverting to digital and remote work. 
Successive re-opening phases started in late April, as concerns 
or businesses and the broader economy started to dominate pol- 
cy discussions, shifting the aim towards controlling the spread of 
he virus. The gradual reopening prioritised the youngest children, 
llowing daycare centers and schools to resume activities (in Fin- 
and facilities for the youngest children remained open the whole 5 eriod). School started to open on 15 th April in Denmark and on 
7 th April in Norway. Finland reopened educational facilities on 
3 th May. In Norway, schools and daycare centers were open for 
hildren of essential health care personnel throughout the period 
nd this was also the case for daycare centers for essential person- 
el in Denmark. In Iceland, childcare and compulsory schools (from 
 to 16 years of age) remained open, subject to infection control 
easures. 
Sweden and Iceland introduced international, while recom- 
ending national, restrictions on mobility. In Sweden, the strategy 
as to issue recommendations aimed at the entire population, be- 
ides targeting recommendations for people aged 70 + and those 
ith an underlying disease. High schools and universities were 
losed and a ban issued in March 2020 on assemblies of more 
han 50 persons (including for sport and music events) was up- 
eld in the entire period. Museums and amusement parks were 
lso closed. 
Further recommendations included working from home if pos- 
ible, and avoiding public transport, unless absolutely necessary. 
on-essential travel from outside the EU/EEA was restricted fol- 
owing the EC recommendations. Later recommendations con- 
erned banning visitors in care homes. In Iceland, people were ad- 
ised not to travel to countries defined as high-risk zones by the 
hief Epidemiologist. 
The overall picture of population level measures shows many 
imilarities, despite the more formal differences in instruments. 
he timing and enforcement of measures varies by country, such 
s when the limitations on visits to nursing homes were intro- 
uced. Internal travel restrictions have been limited in space and 
ime, and lockdowns have not been as strict as in some other Euro- 
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Table 3 
Overview resources and measures for testing, tracing and isolating in the Nordic countries during the first 6 months (March through August). 




Sufficient by May 
2020 
Testing free 
Limited, sufficient by 
summer 2020 
Public testing free 
Limited, sufficient 
from early spring 
2020 
Extremely limited, 
Sufficient by May 
Testing free 
Extremely limited. 









Supported by NIPH 
Regions 





Mandatory Mandatory, Penalty 
upon violation 
Mandatory Mandatory No 
Isolation upon 
diagnosed with C-19 
Mandatory 
Penalty upon violation 
Mandatory 
Penalty upon violation 
Mandatory 
Penalty upon violation 
Mandatory 
Penalty upon violation 
Mandatory 
Isolation upon 
diagnosed with C-19 
Mandatory Self-isolation 
(voluntary) 
Mandatory Mandatory Adviced 
Support 
Access to quarantine 
facilities free of 
charge 













































































ean countries, especially on rules for leaving the house. The inter- 
al travel ban was enforced more strongly in Finland and Norway, 
han in Denmark, Iceland and Sweden. 
In Denmark and Norway, there have been a shift towards re- 
ional or local differentiation in measures based on the local levels 
f infection by the autumn of 2020. In Finland and Sweden, re- 
ional differentiation is the rule by default as it is based on the 
xisting regulation. 
reventing transmission through testing, tracing and isolating 
The common strategy across much of Europe for COVID-19 has 
een to ensure early diagnosis, isolation, as well as quarantining 
f cases in order to slow the spread as much as possible and to 
inimize the burden on health services. This is also known as the 
ind-Test-Trace-Isolate-Support strategy (FTTIS). 
The testing capacity was extremely limited across the countries 
t the beginning of the pandemic. Initially, only people with se- 
ere symptoms and more vulnerable groups were referred to test- 
ng, followed by a strict testing priority of vulnerable groups and 
ealth personnel. With different speed, starting with Iceland, all 
ordic countries managed to expand their testing capacity. Once 
emand for testing was matched, all Nordic countries have relied 
n incidence figures for municipalities/regions to make informed 
djustment of preventive policies. 
Regulations for contact tracing differ somewhat between the 
ountries ( Table 3 ), and have changed over time. In Denmark, indi- 
iduals who tested positive for COVID-19 infection were initially 
equested to track down their own recent contacts. From 12 th 
ay 2020, the Danish Patient Safety Authority assumed respon- 
ibility for assistance in tracing close contacts. In Finland, Iceland 
nd Norway, contact tracing has been in place since the onset of 
he epidemic. In Finland and Norway, regional/local authorities are 
esponsible for contact tracing, and in Norway, Norwegian Insti- 
ute of Public Health (NIPH) may assist in contact tracing and has 
he authority to obtain contact details about passengers in pub- 
ic transport. In Iceland, a specialised contact tracing team within 
he Civil Protection Department has the overall responsibility for 
ontact tracing. Norway and Finland launched online educational 
ourses for staff responsible for contact tracing at the local level. In 
weden, SPHA abandoned the strategy of contact tracing as a na- 
ional level policy in mid-March due to the high number of cases 
n certain regions. Contact tracing was resumed as a national pol- 
cy during the summer 2020. 6 Mobile apps developed to detect close contacts were introduced 
n Iceland and Norway in April 2020, followed by Denmark in June 
nd Finland in September. If an app user is diagnosed with COVID- 
9, other users who have been close contact are informed that 
hey may have been exposed to COVID-19, without revealing the 
dentity of the initial case. Privacy issues were raised about GPS- 
racking and central storage of data in Norway, and the initial app 
se was discontinued. A new app, similar to the Danish one, was 
eveloped over the autumn 2020. 
Isolation and quarantine are regulated by the infectious dis- 
ase legislation in all the Nordic countries. Self-isolation is consid- 
red mandatory for all patients diagnosed with COVID-19, whereas 
uarantine is recommended in Sweden and mandatory in the other 
ordic countries for people who have been exposed to the virus. 
solation can be enforced in all countries and the patient is entitled 
o benefits covering income losses. With the exemption of Swe- 
en, isolation is also required for those who have been travelling 
n specified areas with widespread transmission. In Sweden, only 
ravellers from abroad with symptoms of COVID-19 are advised to 
uarantine. The Nordic countries have closed their borders to all 
on-essential travel from countries outside EU/EEA with some ex- 
mptions. Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway have introduced 
oluntary testing for COVID-19 for passengers arriving from abroad. 
The welfare system ensuring financial support in case of unem- 
loyment or sickness has been an important factor for adherence 
o these measures during the pandemic. In Denmark, Finland, Ice- 
and and Norway, municipalities/health authorities are obliged to 
rovide a place to stay for those who are unable to self-isolate at 
ome, e.g. in hotels. Finland, Iceland and Norway have also defined 
evels of penalty involved for violation of the isolation rules. 
nowledge behind COVID-19 decisions 
Political decisions have in general been informed by advice 
rom the respective national agencies or committees. However, de- 
isions have also been made without clear support or upon con- 
icting advice from the advisory bodies. Even though access to 
vidence-based knowledge and clinical guidelines is an important 
actor in the handling of the pandemic, it appears that ad-hoc in- 
ependent commissions and expert groups have played an impor- 
ant role. The base for various decisions is not entirely clear. 
In Denmark, political decisions are informed by advice from the 
anish Health Authority and SSI. The advice is based on the best 
vailable evidence. In some cases, the national government has im- 
osed harder restrictions than recommended by the health agen- 
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ies due to political concerns and as a “cautionary principle”. This 
as particularly seen in the early phases, where the Danish Health 
uthority advised against closing borders, schools and day care 
acilities, since evidence pointed to limited preventive effects on 
ransmission. Yet, the Government decided to impose lock down 
easures with some support from SSI. This example also illustrates 
ccasional disagreement among the agencies, which have also been 
riticized for lack of transparency about data and prediction mod- 
ls. 
In Finland, it has not been possible to fully assess the knowl- 
dge base for the decisions as the Government and the officials the 
inistries and the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) 
id not, in the beginning, publish all epidemiological models and 
ther relevant evidence. However, there has been an aim to strive 
or evidence-based policies as the government has appointed a sci- 
ntific panel to support the generation of evidence, as well as as- 
embled a number of expert groups to support the governmental 
ecision making [19] . 
In Iceland, policy decisions are published together with the rec- 
mmendations from the Chief Epidemiologist and are reported to 
e based on the best available evidence. A governmental multi- 
ector steering group was established to monitor the social and 
conomic impact of the public health responses to the COVID-19 
andemic, and also provide recommendations on policy measures. 
 council of seven experts appointed by the Minister of Health is 
verseeing policy and measures taken in response to communica- 
le diseases. 
In Norway, NIPH regularly publishes risk-response reports with 
trategic advice on handling the pandemic. The institute advised 
gainst the closure of schools and day care facilities, as well as the 
ational travel ban imposed in the early stages of the pandemic. 
his was in conflict with the final advice given by the Directorate 
f Health as advised by the National Preparedness Commission. In- 
ormation on the agenda and decisions processes in the prepared- 
ess commission have not been transparent. An independent ex- 
ert commission was appointed to assess the socio-economic con- 
equences of implemented policy measures. 
The government in Sweden relaied on the principle of dele- 
ated authority (responsibility of advice on pandemics) which rests 
ithin the Swedish Public Health and Infectious Disease Control 
gency. 
There have been a number of expert groups appointed to give 
ecommendations and propositions to the government. The Prime 
inister’s Office and different Ministries have published these, for 
arious restrictive measures such as use of face masks. 
Furthermore, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have all 
ppointed independent national commissions to evaluate the en- 
ire course of the COVID-19 crisis. The commissions are set up to 
valuate the preparedness for and handling of the COVID-19 pan- 
emic as well as to report on transparency of policies. 
iscussion 
This paper presents a descriptive analysis of how the Nordic 
ountries compared in terms of governance and policy measures 
n response to the COVID-19 pandemic at population level mainly 
rom March until August 2020. By mapping legislation and the na- 
ional governance of pandemic responses, the analysis shows that 
he initial use of regulatory instruments, as well as in governance 
f policies differed. The COVID-19 pandemic posed new challenges 
s it differs somewhat from scenarios described in influenza pan- 
emic preparedness plans. 
By the end of February 2020, COVID-cases were registered in all 
he Nordic countries. In March Finland, Iceland and Norway were 
n a state of national emergency. Denmark, Finland and Norway 7 ad issued a partial national lockdown, whereas Sweden called for 
aution and remained open. 
overnance by recommendations rest on high levels of societal trust 
All countries have strong central public administrations with 
gencies providing oversight and recommendations of pandemics. 
easures in general have been similar across the countries (albeit 
ith some variation in timing) and in most cases the authorities 
elied on recommendations rather than legislation. Recommenda- 
ions were used to advice on working from home, limiting pri- 
ate and public social gatherings and traveling abroad. Sweden im- 
osed some of the same measures, including transition to online 
eaching in high schools and universities and recommendations to 
ork from home whenever possible. Policy measures introduced in 
he autumn of 2020 brought Sweden even closer to the approach 
dopted in the other Nordic countries. 
The extensive reliance on recommendations led to fewer for- 
al restrictions in the first phase of the pandemic in the Nordic 
ountries compared with much of the EU/EEA. In general, the re- 
trictions on internal mobility have been very limited in time and 
rea. Bans on visits to nursing homes and hospitals were only en- 
orced strongly in a few months. There have been no curfews or 
onfinement to homes, with the exception of isolation and quar- 
ntine. Restrictions on mass gatherings have been implemented in 
ll countries to reduce contact. Face masks for the population have 
nly been required in specific places when physical distancing is 
ot possible (bars, public transportation, hospitals, nursing homes, 
tc.). 
The public in the Nordic countries generally express a high de- 
ree of trust towards fellow citizens and governments which has 
emained high during the pandemic [20–23] . All the Nordic gov- 
rnments actively appealed to their population for collective ac- 
ion to fight the pandemic, and appear to have mostly succeeded 
 24 , 25 ]. National media have been perceived as surprisingly sup- 
ortive of their respective governments in the initial phases [26] . 
Criticism and political debate have increased as the countries 
ave moved from variations of lockdown towards gradual reopen- 
ng. Denmark and Sweden are portrayed as two outliers; Danish 
edia were initially perceived to be too consensus-oriented and 
upportive of national governance, whereas the Swedish media 
uestioned politics and governance, thus fostering more public de- 
ate [27] . The latter is not surprising given that Swedish approach 
as attracted wide international attention. 
ordic countries varied in the use of state of emergency as a legal 
nstrument to centralise power 
Declaring a state of emergency allowed the governments’ ac- 
ess to legislative resources they do not possess under normal cir- 
umstances. The government temporarily gains the legal means to 
mpose potentially far-reaching policy measures infringing on per- 
onal liberties, as well as overriding the decentralisation of power 
mbedded in the governance of the Nordic health care systems. 
he European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) safeguards the 
ndividual’s rights, also against measures that can be invoked un- 
er public health epidemic legislation, such as freedom of move- 
ent between and within countries [28] . Declaring a state of 
mergency may be a way to sidestep these rights. 
For Sweden, unlike in the other Nordic countries, declaration of 
 state of emergency limiting the individuals’ liberty is not a le- 
al option in the case of a pandemic. This is in contrast to Iceland 
here declaration of emergency is a precondition in order to in- 
oke the highest level of response in the contingency plans. Both 
inland and Norway chose to declare a state of emergency early 
n, even though it is not clear whether it was a necessary course 
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f action to implement measures taken. It is, however, clear that 
he use of emergency powers has limited the decentralised power 
mbedded in the health care systems, and infringed patient rights 
uch as the right to treatment within a specific time frame. Den- 
ark has refrained from its use so far. The use or abuse of emer-
ency powers are increasingly subject of public debate. 
It has been argued that Norway and Finland have been more 
reoccupied with individual rights and constitutional aspects of 
he chosen policy measures during the pandemic, although in Den- 
ark and Sweden such discussions have also surfaced. Another ex- 
lanation for the differences in use of emergency powers may lie 
n the democratic tradition [ 18 , 26 ]. Even though a stronger tra-
ition for the use of legislative measures might have a stronger 
oothold in some countries than others, it is not evident why an 
xternal shock like a pandemic triggered so different legal re- 
ponses. Another explanation might be differences in emergency 
reparedness, where civil preparedness seems to have been less 
rominent on the political agenda in Sweden. 
Effort s to coordinate operational and capacity issues, as well as 
mplementation of measures across government levels have been 
ubstantial; however, there have been some ongoing challenges, 
eflecting the broadly decentralised nature of the Nordic health 
ystems’ function. Denmark, Iceland and Norway have all estab- 
ished formal coordination commissions for emergency crisis re- 
ponse, which include relevant national level authorities from dif- 
erent sectors and other relevant stakeholders, in line with existing 
mergency preparedness plans. 
pecialist advisory agencies and expert groups played a strong role in 
he decision-making, although with varying degree of transparency 
Strategic decisions have been made at the national level by 
oliticians, after consultation and advice presented by agencies 
nd commissions, with the exemption of Sweden where the Public 
ealth Agency has been at the centre of strategic decision mak- 
ng. In Norway, the Ministry of Health delegated the powers to the 
irectorate of Health until April 2020. Overall strategic goals are 
imilar across the Nordic, emphasizing the need to protect vulner- 
ble groups and hospital resources in order to maintain universal 
ccess to care. In addition there have been extensive use of ad hoc 
xpert advisory groups and evaluations. These groups may func- 
ion as a supplement to the existing governance structures, per- 
aps indicating a more general tendency to initiate expert advice 
o inform political consensus processes as a tool of support for the 
egular administration. 
ountries faced different conditions for preventing transmission 
Another important factor to consider when comparing onset 
nd spread of the pandemic is the changing criteria and volume 
f testing in the countries. In the first months, the testing strategy 
nly targeted people with obvious symptoms and health person- 
el at risk, whereas in the autumn testing was available for nearly 
ll. Even though testing strategies were similar, capacity differed 
nd caution should be taken in comparisons before the summer of 
020. 
Rigorous contact tracing, followed by self-isolation and quaran- 
ine have been particularly strong in Iceland, Norway and Finland 
uring the pandemic. The use of emergency powers ensured access 
o require hotels as quarantine facilities. 
 number of pre-existing factors and chosen responses distinguished 
weden from other Nordic countries 
Sweden has been an outlier in the burden of COVID-19 mortal- 
ty and excess deaths compared to the other Nordic countries. As 8 his analysis shows, there are differences in the legislative frame- 
orks, which did not allow Sweden to declare a state of emer- 
ency, leaving the government with fewer instruments to use early 
n. In addition, responsibility for pandemic emergency planning is 
ecentralised to the 21 regions, whereas in the other Nordic coun- 
ries decentralised plans are governed by national plans. The level 
f decentralisation likely contributed to lack of consistency and in- 
ensity of response. One potential explanation is that fragmenta- 
ion and diluted responsibilities between local, regional and state 
uthorities left gaps in times of a crisis, that the government strug- 
led filling fast enough, as expertise and analytical capacity are lo- 
ated in the agencies. 
Other factors could also be at play in Sweden. First, there have 
een reports that herd immunity has been pursued as part of the 
trategy of handling the virus in Sweden [23] . While the govern- 
ent and SPHA has denied this, herd immunity was nevertheless 
een as an outcome of wide societal spread, rather than an official 
oal, the agency seemed to underestimate the spread of the dis- 
ase and the potential to halt the spread through strict measures. 
his could explain the authorities unwillingness to seek ways for 
tronger implementation of restrictions, in the initial phase of the 
andemic. Other Nordic countries sought stricter measures of pre- 
enting the spread earlier, a more precautionary-based response 
f the direct effects of the pandemic. It should be noted that in 
weden a temporary legislation passed in the spring 2020, em- 
owered the government to impose restrictions, such as temporary 
losure of shopping malls, but the government chose not to invoke 
t. As such, it was a political (in)decision. Second, a large number 
f COVID-19 fatalities occurred among residents in long term care 
ettings, reflecting not only the high infection rates in general, but 
lso structural weaknesses in this area (such as the high level of 
emporary staff not eligible for sickness benefits, larger-size insti- 
utions, widespread lack of PPE and guidance on possibility to ban 
isitors) have had an impact [27] . Finally, another early step, was to 
bandon contact tracing in the general population, which is consid- 
red to be an essential tool to control the spread of the virus [25] .
his was explained by the lack of resources to cope with tracing 
hen the incidence started rising rapidly in Stockholm area; how- 
ver, SPHA hereby put less focus on continued tracing in other re- 
ions, where the number of cases was still low. 
onclusions 
There have been an abundancy of research trying to link policy 
easures and outcomes, less research on the overall governance 
nd resilience of health systems or impact of welfare system on 
he outcome of the pandemic. The welfare systems in the Nordic 
ountries function as a safety net for the population, ensuring less 
evastating consequences and enables high level of trust. 
Our findings suggest that despite the many similarities in pol- 
cy measures between the five countries, there are also interesting 
ifferences in governance of the COVID-19 pandemic, and clear dif- 
erences in outcomes so far. The differences in governance may be 
inked to different explanatory models. Sweden and Finland dif- 
er from Norway and Denmark in the degree of decentralization. 
celand, Finland and Norway are relying more on the formal le- 
alization of measures than Denmark and Sweden. This analysis 
f governance is indicative of more diverse responses than antic- 
pated, taken the common background and the common prepared- 
ess agreed upon in the Nordic council. This diversity in gover- 
ance of health systems might reflect more generic response mod- 
ls installed in the different governments. 
A common feature for Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Norway 
s the extensive use of expert advice in and outside the special- 
st agencies by the political leaders of the country, and reliance on 
 number of internal coordination fora between ministries, agen- 
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ies and other relevant public authorities to facilitate a consensus- 
ased development of policy measures. Sweden, on another hand, 
eems to have relied on technical expertise of the public health 
gency, with politicians distancing from the decision-making pro- 
ess. While regional/local authorities in Denmark, Finland, Iceland 
nd Norway formally have the power to implement stricter mea- 
ures when deemed necessary, this is usually coordinated with or 
ven imposed by the national level. Swedish regional/local authori- 
ies in practice have more discretion to decide and implement pol- 
cy measures under the guidance of SPHA. 
It also seems plausible that a number of other structural and 
ircumstantial factors have played an important role in variations 
n outcomes across the Nordic countries. In particular, it is rele- 
ant to further explore the importance of housing conditions, pop- 
lation density, and behaviour in particular population groups as 
otential explanatory factors. Both Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
weden have seen high incidence rates among migrant populations 
nd temporary migrant workers. It should be noted that both Den- 
ark and Sweden managed to curb high levels of infections in 
he population without enforcing a total lockdown after the initial 
hase. 
Finally, there is a need to call for caution for when and how 
xceptional emergency powers are invoked. Denmark, Finland, Nor- 
ay and Sweden have all appointed national commissions to eval- 
ate the entire course of the COVID-19 crisis. The commissions are 
et up to evaluate the preparedness for and handling of the COVID- 
9 pandemic as well as to report on transparency of policies. It is a 
ood time to question how the handling of the COVID-19 epidemic 
ill influence future communicable disease control legislation and 
hether the current crisis have a lasting impact on the key princi- 
le of governance in the Nordic countries. 
The findings here are based on an analysis of the early stages, 
nd caution must be taken in the interpretation of the results. They 
o however point to important features of the health systems in 
he Nordic countries. It would be of interest to compare the Nordic 
ountries’ response to other welfare or health systems, such as the 
K or Germany, the states of New England or Kaiser Permanente 
n the US, the latter two being more of a comparable size. 
Further research is necessary to determine the degree to which 
espective populations comply with the recommended measures. 
ven though the availability of comparable data within and across 
he countries are good in terms of testing, incidence rates, mobility 
nd outcomes (COVID-19-related, as well as total mortality), little 
s known on how compliant the population is in following the ad- 
ice and regulations. 
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